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PASSWORD-LESS TRUST BASED ACCESS AUTHORIZATION FOR REMOTE 
INTERNET-OF-THINGS (IOT) DEVICES 
 








The industry is moving away from password-based authorizations as they are often 
difficult to manage and are associated with various risks. Techniques herein solve an 
important issue with regard to remote Internet of Things (IoT) gateway access by utilizing 
a password-less trust-based authentication mechanism through which dynamic trust-based 
authorizations can be provided for devices utilizing a combination of a user trust score and 
a device risk profile in a unique manner.  Such an approach will improve IoT security and 
will also help to solve an important security issue within the IoT/industrial world. 
 
DETAILED DESCRIPTION 
A typical IoT environment may include thousands of sensors that connect to their 
respective gateways. As this network continues to grow, more and more edge devices, 
sensors, and gateways to manage the devices are typically added to such a network. As the 
sensors often come from different vendors, there is often continuous maintenance work 
that occurs as new sensors are added to the network or older ones are replaced.  
Such network management/updates typically involve access to the edge gateways 
by different vendors in order to make configuration adjustments and/or install specific 
applications/micro-services. There are different mechanisms to access edge devices, such 
as remote access via some cloud management service, direct console access, or access via 
standard remote connections such as a virtual private network (VPN).  All of these methods 
involve some form of password-based authentication and authorization mechanism to login 
to edge devices, which many times are based on a standard active directory for a common 
troubleshooting access. This poses a great security threat in which the chances of 
misconfiguring or exposing sensor data and/or information is very high. 
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Thus, existing method of access control rely on the credentials for providing access 
to IoT gateways. It is often observed that such credentials are shared between employees 
to avoid the hassle of creating new accounts. This also creates a security issue for the entire 
network as sensors from different vendors are often connected to these edge devices. There 
is no existing technique to control access to a specific section of a gateway configuration 
based on the true identity of the requestor or a trust factor associated with that individual. 
As per the Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) 2018, the top 
vulnerabilities for IoT networks are primarily concerned with security aspects, such as: 
 Weak Guessable or Hardcoded Passwords; 
 Insufficient Privacy Protection and Authorization; 
 Lack of Device Management; 
 Insecure Default Settings; and/or 
 Lack of Physical Hardening. 
 
One can easily find a list of commonly used passwords on the web and apply brute 
force to break-in to/access a secure system. Statistics that show even with the awareness of 
weak passwords and their associated security threats, many companies still are not 100% 
safe from the threats that originate from secure access. 
Another major concern with a password-based or simple Multi-Factor 
Authentication (MFA)-based solution is that a user is authenticated or authorized only once 
during an initial login and is not continuously monitored if the same person is accessing 
the network device post-validation. 
 Accordingly, there is a dire need for a solution that tackles these issues and 
strengthens the accessibility of IoT gateways or endpoints, especially in an environment in 
which these gateways cannot be physically secured. 
To combat such issues as noted above, this proposal provides a novel solution that 
generates a risk profile of any user who wishes to attempt a login into a gateway, edge 
device, or an IoT console. The risk profile is a unique profile of a user that calculates a risk 
factor of the user and determines what type of access are recommended for the user. The 
risk profile can be stored into a device.  There are a multitude of parameters that can be 
used to ensure that a given user accessing a given endpoint is exposed to only the specific 
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portion of the endpoint, which goes beyond the standard password-based authentications 
that are typically provided in networks.  Accordingly, techniques of this proposal provide 
a novel solution that allows password-less continuous authentication/authorization of a 
user to access a specific configuration on an IoT gateway via different access methods. 
In order to explain the solution of this proposal, consider, as an example, a situation 
involving a healthcare IoT infrastructure in which there are hundreds of medical sensors 
deployed at a network edge that are connected to the IoT gateways.  In a scenario in which 
a technician is required to login to the IoT gateways to access the sensors, a generic 
company username and password may be provided that the technician can use to login to 
the gateways. At times, the technician can also login via a personal computer and establish 
a Secure Shell (SSH) or Telnet connection.  However, there may be scenarios where a 
fellow colleague uses the authorized personal device to gain quick access. Many times, the 
generic username/password is also passed to others in order to perform a quick fix over the 
devices. Scenarios like this open-up possibilities for security breaches and 
misconfigurations or exposure of data. 
In order to augment secure access, this proposal provides for applying the concept 
of a trust score in a novel manner so that it can be integrated into a Continuous MFA 
(CMFA) ideology. 
Common endpoints such as mobile devices are the bridge to many Two-Factor 
Authentication (2FA) mechanisms such that the same mobile endpoint can be used as a 
tool in continuously authenticating a user and the user's identity. In accordance with 
techniques of this proposal, a trust score can be tied to a mobile endpoint using a CMFA 
agent that could be deployed as dedicated hardware and/or software in a trusted execution 
environment (TEE). This trust score can include: 
 Who a user is, based on his/her gait, biometrics, personality traits, etc., which 
can be sent by the mobile device; and 
 The previous history of login attempts, resets, domain access, and device 
configuration change of devices (e.g., collected from logs). This information 
can be collected from the mobile device and added by a cloud server to create 
an enhanced trust score. 
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Consider an example workflow, as follows: 
1) A user performs a login to an IoT Operations Center with credentials; 
Note: IoT Operations Center is assumed to be a cloud-based 
application/platform to manage IoT gateways and devices. 
2) When a user tries to access one of the connected gateways remotely, the 
user trust score is pulled from the CMFA agent running on a mobile device 
of the user. A domain name that includes the domain associated with the 
user and the user's device details are sent to a trust engine or logic that 
calculates the enhanced trust score based on: the trust score of the user + the 
domain name + any previous configuration changes and device access 
details; 
3) This trust score is sent to an Identity and Access Management (IAM) server, 
which generates tokens based on the trust score and role assigned to the user. 
This generated token can then be used to connect to a gateway remotely 
with allowed access that is based on various factors; 
4) Configuration on the device will be categorized into a specific zone that can 
include: 
o Critical connectivity; 
o Device configuration; 
o An Organizationally Unique Identifier (OUI)-based show 
configuration; or 
o A protocol-based configuration (e.g., Message Queuing Telemetry 
Transport (MQTT), connectors, micro-service access, etc.). 
 
The access token authorizes the user/vendor to access a specific part of a 
configuration and keeps sending accounting updates associated with the token.  If the trust 
score reduces or the user attempts to make unauthorized changes, this results in the token 
being invalidated and the trust score decayed for the individual.  Figure 1, below, illustrates 
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Figure 1: Example Operational Flow Involving Local Access to an IoT Gateway using a 
Trust-Based Access Token 
 
For the technique as illustrated in Figure 1, it is assumed that the IoT gateway has 
connectivity to an IoT Operations Center, but the user is trying to access the device using 
local console access. In such a use-case, the user authentication would proceed as follows: 
1) When the user opens the trust score application, the most current, valid trust 
score is generated.  The mobile device of the user already has its device 
identity (ID) registered. (Device ID is a parameter that determines the 
authoritative access of the user within the user's organization); 
2) When the user clicks on 'Create Token' within the application, the access 
token is created based on the combination of the trust score and the device 
ID. Thus, the access token that can be created is based on: 
i. Device ID parameters that indicate an access level for the user; and 
ii. Trust score parameters that indicate how much access is safe to give 
to the user. 
3) The access token is now passed to the Operations Center, which determines 
the level of access to be granted to its user. The Operations Center 
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commands the remote gateway to display a Quick-Response (QR) code on 
the device screen, which the user can scan via the user's mobile device; 
4) If this scan proceeds correctly, the client/mobile endpoint will send an OK 
signal to the server and the user obtains access to the remote gateway; 
5) The trust score is continuously verified by the trust engine in the IoT 
Operations Center.  In one instance, the verification could be facilitated via 
a Near-Field Communication (NFC) or Bluetooth™ link between the device 
and the user's mobile device. 
 
The entire method can be transparent to the user and he/she just needs to scan the 
QR code. 
Consider another technique, for a use-case in which it is assumed that the IoT 
gateway does not have connectivity to the IoT Operations Center vendor and a user desires 
direct console access. 
For this use-case, the authentication would proceed via out-of-band authorization 
provisioning, as described below and as illustrated in Figure 2, as follows: 
1) With the help of Bluetooth™ or any NFC technology, the IoT gateway can 
detect the presence of the mobile device requesting access to the direct 
console (assuming that IoT gateway is enabled for NFC/Bluetooth™ 
communications).  The user will generate the access request and will share 
the access request with the gateway. Based on the request received, the 
device will generate an Access-Request Code that includes a hash of the 
device ID, serial number, Media Access Control (MAC) address, and/or 
other details; 
2) The generated Access-Request Code is passed to CMFA agent on the 
mobile device, which then combines the trust score and user domain and 
submits the same to the IoT Operations Center for console access approval; 
and 
3) The IoT Operations Center will generate an access token with a specific 
access level binding and passes the access token back to the mobile device, 
which the user can use to obtain direct console access. 
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Figure 2: Example Operational Flow 
 Thus, techniques herein provide for establishing and verifying user identity in a 
continuous manner by combining: a continuous validation if the same user is accessing the 
network all the time, a continuous validation of the user's behavior with a specific device 
on the network; and historical access to the device and/or changes from the same or 
different user sets.  Additionally, techniques herein can be utilized through both in-band or 
out-of-band transport scenarios that facilitate CMFA-based authorizations in a secure, yet 
easy-to-use solution. 
In contrast to other potential solutions involving cryptographic operations, 
techniques herein provide for authenticating a user based on an enhanced trust score that is 
calculated based on the user's previous activity on the network, the device in-use, and 
continuous validation of user-device combination.  Along with this, the solution of this 
proposal seeks to authenticate users based on an updated risk factor in a continuous interval 
of time so that impersonation of the critical infrastructure or session hijacking types of 
attacks can be prevented. In the solution provided herein, if a user's risk factor degrades 
from a certain amount then access for the user can be reduced and/or denied altogether.   
Further, the solution provided herein utilizes MFA in a continuous manner while 
having the ability to use different parameters that identify both a user and the user's device, 
in a unique manner in order to facilitate dynamic access control. The trust score can be 
8
Palande et al.: PASSWORD-LESS TRUST BASED ACCESS AUTHORIZATION FOR REMOTE INTERNE
Published by Technical Disclosure Commons, 2021
 8 6649 
continuously generated or updated based on various parameters, such as device behavior, 
history of changes, and user authorization. Thus, the unique solution of this proposal 
provides for utilizing a combination of human, machine, and network-based continuous 
authorization in a novel manner in order to provide access to network devices without the 
need for usernames/passwords. 
In summary, techniques herein provide a unique and novel solution that involves 
generating an enhanced trust score that allows CMFA for a specific user in context of the 
devices that the user is trying to access. This is a novel concept that differs from existing 
solutions involving basic MFA-based authorizations. However, such a solution could be 
integrated into MFA-based authorizations to support password-less intelligent device 
access.  Thus, a unique solution is provided herein that facilitates access to specific controls 
within a device configuration and is tied to dynamic validation against an enhanced trust 
score. This provides real time control to what a user can do/configure when having access 
to a device. This a very different and novel concept as compared to Remote Authentication 
Dial-In User Service (RADIUS) or Terminal Access Controller Access-Control System 
Plus (TACACS+) offerings.  Further, techniques herein allow continuous in-band 
validation and authorization of users for device access by using a screen generated QR 
code, while also using the continuous trust score from the mobile agent or allow continuous 
out-of-band validation and authorization using near field access technologies and hashing 
methods. 
While the techniques presented herein are discussed with reference to remote IoT 
device access, it is to be understood that the same concepts as described herein can be used 
for any network device access that today relies on any MFA/RADIUS/TACACS+ 
authorization scheme.  As the IoT industry is looking for password-less network access 
methods, this proposal fits well with a unique approach that uses a combination of human, 
network and device logs for providing access. 
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